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1. INTRODUCTION 
The events of the Arab Spring and subsequent developments in 
Libya and Egypt raise profound questions regarding the tension 
between international humanitarian intervention and state 
sovereignty in the context of geo-politics.  In examining this 
tension, it is necessary to understand overarching geo-political 
considerations regarding issues critical to understanding 
international relations and international law in a paradigm best 
described as “murky.”  This murkiness applies to facts on the 
ground and the legal and policy questions confronting decision 
makers, both regionally and globally.  While the Arab Spring was 
widely perceived as the dawn of a new age in the Middle East, it is 
too early to fully assess its consequences. 
On the one hand, elections in Egypt reflect change while 
continued massacres in Syria, on the other hand, recall the actions 
of previous Middle Eastern regimes.  The question regarding Syria 
is: when do humanitarian considerations justify intervention into a 
sovereign state?  The question the international community would 
face regarding Egypt is: how should it respond if the Morsi 
government reneges on preexisting international obligations?  
While some would point to Egypt’s free and fair elections as a 
positive indicator, others would suggest that the outcome is 
troubling, for it potentially portends significant changes in 
Egyptian foreign policy.  After all, the electoral successes of the 
Muslim Brotherhood suggest that changes are in the offing. 
Perhaps Bob Dylan’s oft-quoted phrase that “the times they are 
a-changin’”1 aptly captures the moment.  But changing where and 
to what?  Because of the uncertainty of the moment, international 
                                                     
* Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. 
1 BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a-Changin’, in BOB DYLAN LYRICS 1962–2001 
81 (Simon and Schuster ed. 2004). 
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decision makers must assess innumerable dilemmas with 
insufficient information resulting from significant changes in 
Egyptian, Syrian, and other Middle Eastern leadership positions.  
After all, one of the practical results—or fall-outs—of dramatic 
regime change is the need to identify new, key decision makers 
and their inner circles, develop new information and intelligence 
sources, and understand the relationship between the new civilian 
leadership and the national security establishment. 
This is an issue that confronts world leaders daily, requiring 
assessment of possible actions by a government that recently 
replaced a deeply entrenched regime that ruled with an iron hand 
but whose commitment to international obligations was 
unquestioned.  Both paradigms raise legitimate concerns regarding 
the relationship between sovereignty, intervention, and geo-
politics.  The Syrian dilemma is tangible and immediate, whereas 
the Egyptian paradigm is suggestive as a hypothetical.  Therefore, 
this Essay focuses on humanitarian intervention—or lack thereof—
in the face of extraordinary human rights violations. 
That is not to suggest that analyzing possible changes in 
Egyptian foreign policy is not important; in the context of post- 
Arab Spring ramifications, the “Egypt to where” question is 
amongst the most important.  One assumes that decision-makers in 
the United States, Israel, Europe, and the Middle East are fully 
engaged in seeking to better understand the future direction, 
policy, and aims of the Morsi government.  While that question is 
of immense importance, it will not be the focus of this Essay, which 
will address the relationship between humanitarian intervention 
and sovereignty under the umbrella of geo-politics.  To that end, 
this Essay will be divided into the following sections: (2) a brief 
overview of humanitarian intervention; (3) a short history of 
Western intervention in the Middle East; (4) a discussion of 
humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty; (5) an 
examination of geo-political considerations; and (6) questions for 
further study. 
2. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The overriding questions with respect to humanitarian 
intervention are (a) for what purpose and (b) to what end.  There 
also exists the distinction between “absolute” and “limited” 
interventions in the context of human rights violations.  With 
respect to sovereignty, the question is whether significant 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss2/6
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violations of human rights justify violation by external actors of a 
nation-state’s sovereignty. 
The current Assad regime in Syria has engaged in unrelenting 
massacre and torture of thousands of Syrian civilians.  Arab and 
Western leaders alike have met those actions, which recall the 
brutality of Assad’s father, with deafening silence.  Whether that 
silence reflects a “what do you expect” attitude, studied 
indifference, or geo-political considerations given the Syrian-
Iranian relationship, is unclear.  What is clear is that, as these lines 
are written, the Syrian regime is engaged in ongoing attacks on 
Syrian civilians.  In the meantime, leaders in the United States, 
Europe, and the Middle East respond with clichés devoid of 
substance or meaning. 
In examining this tension, it is necessary to understand 
overarching geo-political considerations.  While legal terminology 
contributes to framing international humanitarian law issues, 
understanding national self-interest and geo-political realities is 
essential to their practical implementation.  Hence, a study of geo-
politics provides the all-encompassing umbrella under which a 
myriad of critical and competing issues must fit.   
Understanding geo-politics requires analysis of four distinct 
factors: self-defense, leadership, humanitarian intervention and 
sovereignty, and international cooperation.  Self-defense is 
particularly important because it addresses the extent and manner 
in which states protect their populations, resources, and interests.  
Leadership is germane to the discussion since it highlights the 
qualities necessary to resolve complicated paradigms reflecting 
distinct disciplines with minimal “margin for error.”  
Humanitarian intervention requires reconciling sovereignty with 
international obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human 
rights.  International cooperation is essential to effective 
implementation of geo-politics on the premise that unilateralism is 
at odds with the principle of a global community. 
Addressing these four factors facilitates understanding the nuts 
and bolts of geo-politics.  While the four topics may seem 
unrelated, I believe that reality suggests otherwise: they are the 
core of geo-politics.  This Essay focuses on humanitarian 
intervention and sovereignty, but the importance of national 
leadership, international cooperation, and self-defense are likewise 
critical components. 
Focusing on the confluence, if not tension, between 
humanitarian intervention and sovereignty highlights the 
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dilemmas confronting contemporary decision-makers.  Resolving 
this tension requires sober analysis of national self-interest while 
recognizing limits of external influence on events occurring within 
another state.  Determining when intervention principles outweigh 
sovereignty rights poses significant dilemmas; the complexity is 
accentuated when national interests are not consistently and 
narrowly defined.  Historians will long engage in questioning 
whether legitimate American interests were truly at stake when 
President George W. Bush ordered U.S. forces into Iraq and 
Afghanistan and President Obama ordered their continued 
presence in Afghanistan.  In the meantime, decision-makers—not 
historians and pundits—must resolve this tension while 
confronting situations marked by uncertainty rather than certainty. 
Contemporary flash-points in the broader Middle East are 
numerous: Iran’s nuclear plans; continuing sectarian conflict in 
Iraq; the aftermath of the Benghazi, Libya attack; increased tension 
between Syria and Turkey; uncertainty regarding possible 
intervention in Syria; continuing war in Afghanistan; efforts by Al-
Qaeda to establish a presence in Northern Sinai;2 and Hezbollah’s 
demonstrated willingness and capability to do Iran’s bidding.3  The 
brazen attack on the American embassy in Cairo4 reflects a 
disturbing combination of a significant intelligence failure, 
seemingly incompetent Egyptian security forces, and a fumbled 
response by the Obama Administration. 
3. THE MIDDLE EAST 
History is replete with examples of Western intervention in the 
Middle East.  Whether through colonization, or military or 
humanitarian intervention, Western intervention in the Middle 
                                                     
2 Yaakov Lappin, Israel Preparing for al-Qaeda on its Borders, GATESTONE INST. 
(July 16, 2012, 04:00 AM), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3169/israel-
borders-al-qaeda.  
3 Patrick Goodenough, Hezbollah: Iran Will Attack U.S. Bases if Israel Bombs 
Iranian Nuclear Facilities, CNSNEWS.COM (Sept. 4, 2012, 3:39 AM), 
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/hezbollah-iran-will-attack-us-bases-if-israel-
bombs-iranian-nuclear-facilities. See also CASEY L. ADDIS & CHRISTOPHER M. 
BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41446, HEZBOLLAH: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 
FOR CONGRESS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2011), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41446.pdf. 
4 Protests Near U.S. Embassy in Cairo Continue After Obama Warning, CNN 
(Sept. 13, 2012, 7:31 PM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/13/ 
world/meast/egypt-us-embassy-protests/index.html. 
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East has in many ways defined the relationship between the West 
and the Middle East.  At one time or another major Western 
powers have had a significant presence in the following nations: 
 
 Palestine (British Palestine Mandate, 1917–1948) 
 Lebanon (France, 1920–1946; United States, 1958) 
 Syria (France, 1920–1946) 
 Jordan/Transjordan (United Kingdom, 1922–1946) 
 Libya (France, 1942–1951) 
 Iran (United Kingdom, 1941–1945) 
 Iraq (British Mandate of Mesopotamia, 1920–1932; 
United States, 2003–present) 
 Afghanistan (United Kingdom, 1839–1919; Soviet 
Union, 1980–1989; United States, 2001–present) 
 United Arab Emirates (United Kingdom, 1819–1968) 
 
Intervention raises profound questions regarding both the 
limits of national sovereignty and the articulation of national self-
interest.  What is defined as intervention can also be described as 
imperialism (as evidenced in many of the aforementioned cases of 
Western intervention in the Middle East).  After all, Western 
powers have historically perceived Middle Eastern oil and trade 
routes as essential to their national interests and have, therefore, 
imposed themselves on indigenous populations. 
The historical basis for Western imperialism was largely a 
combination of: the availability of much needed natural resources, 
cheap labor, geo-politics, and Christian missionaries.  The result 
was both taking (natural resources) and purported giving 
(Christianity and democratic values).  The intended beneficiary 
was the Western power; in large part the indigenous people were 
victimized.  That said, some have suggested Western powers also 
contributed to local cultures by introducing democratic values and 
traditions, but the grim tale of post-colonial Africa suggests a 
significantly different reality. 
One of the clear results of World War II is the dusk that settled 
on traditional Western European powers.  While the sun (as the 
expression went) never set on the British Empire, since World War 
II, the United Kingdom has become almost exclusively focused 
domestically (including on the Troubles in Northern Ireland) and 
France has largely disengaged (following withdrawals from 
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Algeria, Vietnam, and Lebanon) from any international 
involvement.5  The post-World War II dawn was largely 
dominated by the Cold War (until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989), as the United States and the Soviet Union (until its fall in 
1991) largely “divided” the world into two (with the exception of 
non-aligned nations) spheres of influence with extraordinary, but 
ultimately restrained, competition for geo-political gains. 
From an American perspective, the desire to achieve a 
particular regional gain often resulted in American support of 
unsavory regimes and leaders
 
for the sole purpose of denying the 
Soviet Union a perceived gain.  In the Cold War context, “victory” 
was piecemeal (if at all), largely limited by the doctrine of nuclear 
mutual assured destruction, and mainly devoid of principle other 
than perceived gain (however defined) at the expense of the other 
side. 
The obsession with the other side led both the United States 
and the Soviet Union to costly military interventions.  Brezhnev’s 
decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979
 
was arguably the beginning 
of the end of the Soviet Union, and the Kennedy-Johnson
 
decision 
to deploy the U.S. military to Vietnam in the early 1960’s continues 
to have a dramatic impact on the U.S. budget, psyche, and armed 
forces.  In both cases, the United States and the Soviet Union 
intervened in a conflict that was “not theirs.”  Soldiers were sent to 
countries whose language, culture, and conflict were foreign to 
them; the mission (other than to stay alive) was unarticulated 
beyond vague and confused rhetoric. 
In November, 2005, I was invited to speak at the U.S. Military 
Academy; it was, without doubt, an extraordinary honor to speak 
with West Point cadets on a wide array of issues relevant to the 
laws of war and morality in armed conflict.  In the context of my 
talk, I addressed the issue of “combat mission” and in particular 
the mission of the United States in Iraq; the topic was, obviously, 
relevant given that many of cadets, upon their commission would 
be posted in Iraq.  I was, both in my talk and in subsequent 
conversations with cadets, struck by a profound lack of clarity and 
palpable vagueness in their articulation of the mission that awaited 
                                                     
5 Whether France’s recent intervention in Mali signals a change in this trend 
remains to be seen.  See Scott Sayare & Alan Cowell, As Mali Fighting Persists, 
France Vows to Exit in Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/02/07/world/africa/france-mali-militants.html?_r=0.  
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them.  Conversations with friends and colleagues who served in 
Vietnam suggest a disturbing similarity in this vein between the 
two conflicts. 
Doubtlessly, a similar talk to Soviet cadets in 1980 would have 
resulted in the same ambiguity regarding their mission in 
Afghanistan; that conflict, ultimately, demonstrated the Red Army 
was little more than a brutal paper tiger. 
4. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND SOVEREIGNTY 
Military intervention can occur for humanitarian purposes.  
NATO intervention (albeit after much tragedy and atrocity) in the 
former Yugoslavia is a clear example, as is U.S. intervention in 
Haiti in 1992.  The philosophy behind humanitarian intervention is 
simple: it stems from the principle that “intervention for human 
protection purposes . . . is supportable when major harm to 
civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in 
question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the 
perpetrator.”6  In other words, humanitarian intervention is based 
on the belief that “when a government turns savagely upon its 
own people” it becomes the responsibility of “[a]ny state capable of 
stopping the slaughter . . . to try to do so.”7 
The brutally repressive regime of President Assad (the elder) 
was made clear where more than ten thousand citizens were 
massacred when Assad ordered the Syrian army to squash a 
purported revolt against the regime in the Syrian town of Hama in 
1982.8  While the brutal nature of the regime (in addition to the 
Hama massacre) was well known and documented, successive U.S. 
Presidents turned a “blind eye” in the name of larger interests and 
goals.  In the context of this pragmatic policy, President Assad 
brutalized his people while negotiating with the United States.  
Simply put, Syrian domestic affairs were an internal matter that the 
United States chose to ignore while focusing on broader geo-
political considerations. 
                                                     
6 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 16 (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS% 
20Report.pdf. 
7 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 101, 108 (4th ed. 2006). 
8 John Kifner, Syrian Troops Are Said to Battle Rebels Encircled in Central City, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1982, at A1. 
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The U.S. “blind eye” policy regarding foreign governments’ 
domestic policy—regardless of its repressive nature and inevitable 
human cost—reflects respect for the principle of national 
sovereignty.  However, as documented above, the United States 
has repeatedly violated that principle when broader American 
interests are perceived to be at stake.9  This brings us to the 
question: Why did the Obama Administration choose not to 
intervene in Syria in the spring and summer of 2011?  How does 
the Obama Administration distinguish between Syria and Libya?  
Why did the extraordinary violation of human rights in the latter 
justify international intervention, whereas the massacre of innocent 
civilians in the former did not?  With respect to Syria, the Obama 
Administration has limited its response largely to rhetoric.  
Secretary of State Clinton commented: “Syria’s future is up to the 
Syrian people . . . but of course the efforts by the opposition to 
come together to organize in order to articulate a political agenda 
is an important part of political reform.”10 
In both Libya11 and Syria12 brutal regimes were deliberately 
torturing, imprisoning and killing their own citizens.  In both 
cases, thousands of citizens were forced to flee their homes 
recognizing that the regime would brook no dissent and give open 
fire orders that enabled indiscriminate shooting by armed forces 
into crowds of individuals.  In other words, both regimes were 
engaged in massacring their citizens.  The power of social media 
contributed to enormous public scrutiny of both regimes.13    
                                                     
9 NIKKIE R. KEDDIE, MODERN IRAN: ROOTS AND RESULTS OF REVOLUTION 235 
(2003) (“Carter followed no clear policy. . . . American military intervention was 
not a serious possibility given the united strength of Iran’s revolutionary 
movement.”); see also ROBERT A. PASTOR, EXITING THE WHIRLPOOL: U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (2d enlarged ed. 2001). 
10 Sebnem Arsu, Clinton Chides Turkey on Rights Record, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/world/middleeast/17turkey.html. 
11 David D. Kirkpatrick & C. J. Chivers, Photos Found in Libya Show Abuses 
Under Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/ 
world/africa/06libya.html?pagewanted=all. 
12 See Syria ‘State-Sanctioned Torture is Crime Against Humanity,’ BBC NEWS 
MIDDLE E., (July 3, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-18684443 (summarizing a Human Rights Watch report that documents the 
arbitrary arrests, torture, and enforced disappearances in Syria’s underground 
prisons since March 2011).  
13 See William Halal, The Arab Spring and the Technology Revolution, WORLD 
FUTURE SOC’Y, (May 27, 2011), http://www.wfs.org/content/arab-spring-and-
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In Libya, opponents of the regime took to the streets.  Though 
uncertainty existed regarding the identity and nature of their 
organization, the Obama Administration14 and NATO15 decided to 
intervene militarily on their behalf.  In a five-month period (April-
August, 2011), the United States flew 5,316 sorties, including 1,210 
airstrike missions and 101 Predator drone strike missions.16  In 
addition, the United States was providing nearly 70% of the 
intelligence capabilities and refueling assets,17 and by July 31, 2011, 
had spent over $896 million since intervention began.18  The stated 
purpose of the military engagement was to force Gadhafi to either 
step down or leave Libya; that mission was accomplished.    
However, there is an important dichotomy:  an organized rebel 
group receives significant international military assistance while a 
largely unorganized opposition barely receives meaningless 
platitudes that accompany non-intervention in the face of 
extraordinary violations of human rights.  Declarations that the 
                                                                                                                        
technology-revolution (recognizing the major role information technology, 
namely social media, played in accelerating the Arab Spring). 
14 President Obama deployed U.S. military forces to Libya without receiving 
congressional authorization under the 1973 War Powers Resolution.  See Charlie 
Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya 
Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/ 
us/politics/16powers.html?pagewanted=all (remarking that “‘U.S. operations do 
not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor 
do they involve U.S. ground troops,’” rendering War Powers authorization 
unnecessary in the eyes of the Administration).  See also Paul Starobin, Op-Ed., A 
Moral Flip-Flop? Defining a ‘War’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/opinion/sunday/harold-kohs-flip-flop-
on-the-libya-question.html?pagewanted=all (illustrating the issue of framing the 
Libyan intervention through a critical examination of Department of State Legal 
Adviser Harold Koh’s position on the applicability of the War Powers 
Resolution). 
15 See Paula Newton, NATO: Libya Mission Will Be to Protect, Not Arm, CNN, 
(Mar. 28, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-28/world/libya.nato_1_nato-
civilians-libya-mission?_s=PM:WORLD (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (indicating that 
NATO’s control of the Libyan operation increased during its early stages). 
16 See Devin Dwyer, US Military Intervention in Libya Cost At Least $896 
Million, posted in Political Punch, ABC NEWS, (Aug. 22, 2011, 6: 43 PM), 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2011/08/us-military-intervention-in-
libya-cost-at-least-896-million-.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2012) (tallying total cost 
as of Aug. 22, 2011). 
17 See generally Mark Benjamin, The White House Hopes You Don’t Google the 
War Powers Resolution, TIME U.S. (June 16, 2011), http://nation.time.com/ 
2011/06/16/white-house-please-dont-goolge-the-war-powers-resolution/ 
(providing a detailed overview of American operations in Libya). 
18 See Dwyer, supra note 16. 
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Syrian regime has lost legitimacy are true, but they are just that—
declarations.  Devoid of intervention, such declarations are akin to 
whistling in the wind.  The essence of the Obama Administration’s 
policy with respect to Syria is mere words, which, needless to say, 
is a far cry from its aggressive intervention policy with respect to 
Libya. 
Herein lies the rub: a compelling argument can be made that 
unorganized Syrians are in greater need of international 
intervention than were organized Libyan rebels.  The United States 
and NATO have deliberately turned their backs on the citizens of 
one country while readily coming to the assistance of the citizens 
of another country.  With this in mind, we turn our focus to 
humanitarian intervention. 
As Professor Ryan Goodman asked, “Should international law 
permit states to intervene militarily to stop a genocide or 
comparable atrocity without Security Council authorization?”19  
According to Article 39, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, “The 
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”20 
While the U.N. authorized the use of military force against 
Libya,21 it has not done so regarding Syria.22,23,24  Does that mean 
                                                     
19 Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 107, 107 (2006). 
20 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
21 See Jay Solomon, Adam Entous & Joe Lauria, U.N. Clears Way for Attack on 
Libya, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748703818204576206373350344478.html (noting that the U.N. 
Security Council authorized military force against Libyan leader Col. Gadhafi’s 
security forces). 
22 See U.N. Security Council Issues Statement Condemning Violence in Syria, 
CNNWORLD (Aug. 3, 2011, 6:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/ 
meast/08/03/syria.unrest/index.html?hpt=hp_t1. 
23 See UN Security Council Issues Statement Condemning Houla Massacre, RT 
(May 28, 2012, 7:34 AM), http://rt.com/news/un-security-syria-houla-348/. 
24 See UN Chief, Security Council Urge Restraint Amid Rising Tensions Along 
Syrian-Turkish Border, UN NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.un.org/ 
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43214#.UH82u650huI (“The members of the 
Council demanded that such violations of international law stop immediately and 
are not repeated.  The members of the Security Council called on the Syrian 
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the United States cannot intervene in Syria?  As Professor 
Goodman and others have written,25 international humanitarian 
intervention raises legitimate questions regarding the pretext to 
“wage wars for ulterior motives.”26  From the perspective of 
international law, a discussion regarding international 
humanitarian intervention requires carefully analyzing the 
relationship between national sovereignty, international 
responsibility, and grave violations of human rights.  The pretext 
argument suggested by Professor Goodman is of justifiable 
concern when examining specific examples of intervention; in the 
two examples discussed in this essay, the application of 
international humanitarian intervention principles reflects the 
inconsistency previously referenced. 
Humanitarian intervention is an inherently complicated 
proposition, because it clearly implies both that nation state “A” is 
engaged in significant violations of the human rights of its own 
citizens, requiring nation state “B” and/or the international 
community to recognize that intervention is essential.27  However, 
analysis of when intervention is deemed essential, and criteria 
justifying intervention suggest both lack of clarity and lack of 
objective standards and benchmarks. 
The lack of clear criteria as to when intervention is justified, if 
not required, suggests that the question is one of interpretation, 
                                                                                                                        
Government to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its 
neighbors. . . .”). 
25 See Goodman, supra note 19 (arguing that, even though legitimate concerns 
to the contrary exist, legalizing unilateral humanitarian intervention can 
discourage wars with ulterior motives); see, e.g., Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory 
Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 321, 322 (2011) (purporting that there 
has been an unnoticed change in international regulatory law allowing for states 
who treat their citizens improperly to come under international scrutiny); Jonah 
Eaton, An Emerging Norm? Determining the Meaning and Legal Status of the 
Responsibility to Protect, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 765, 784-94 (2011) (discussing 
humanitarian intervention); Nicolas Lamp, Conceptions of War and Paradigms of 
Compliance: The ‘New War’ Challenge to International Humanitarian Law, 16 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 225, 225 (2011). 
26  Goodman, supra note 19. 
27 See Learn about the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, INT’L 
COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-coalition (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2013) (detailing an effort to impose a normative standard for demanding 
preventative intervention). 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subject to specific circumstances and particular interests.28  In that 
vein, then, the question is: why does the United States not 
determine that the actions of the Syrian government justify 
international humanitarian intervention?  As of July 2012, the 
Syrian death toll was estimated to exceed 17,000 people.29  At the 
time of writing, estimates of deaths in the conflict vary, with 
figures ranging from 28,00030 to 33,000.31  In addition to the rising 
death toll, up to 28,000 people have been reported missing or in 
military or militia custody since the protests began.32  The United 
                                                     
28 Compare Chris Borgen, The “Libya and Humanitarian Intervention” Meme, 
OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 24, 2011, 7:07 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/02/24/the-
libya-and-humanitarian-intervention-meme (compiling internet commentary on 
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s referencing humanitarian intervention in Libya), and Asli 
Ü. Bâli & Ziad Abu-Rish, On International Intervention and the Dire Situation in 
Libya, JADALIYYA (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/ 
725/on-international-intervention-and-the-dire-situation-in-libya (comparing 
Libya with Tunisia and Egypt and cautioning against intervention), with Issandr 
El Amrani, A Different Take On Foreign Intervention in Libya, ARABIST (Feb. 24, 2011, 
09:02 AM), http://www.arabist.net/blog/2011/2/24/a-different-take-on-foreign-
intervention-in-libya.html (opposing foreign military intervention), and Shadi 
Hamid, It’s Time to Intervene, SLATE (Feb. 23, 2011, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2286184 (giving the international community options 
for supporting a regime change in Libya).  
29 See Syria Crisis: Death Toll Tops 17,000, Says Opposition Group, HUFFPOST 
WORLD (July 9, 2012, 8:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/09/ 
syria-crisis-death-toll-17000_n_1658708.html. 
30 See ‘Massacre’ Alleged as Syria Slams Outside ‘Interference’, CNN (Oct. 2, 2012, 
1:52 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/01/world/meast/syria-civil-war/ 
?hpt=hp_t1 (referencing casualty figures stated by the Local Coordination 
Committees of Syria). 
31 See Syria Conflict Death Toll at Least 33,000NGO, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE 
(Oct. 13, 2012, 6:46 PM), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/288388/syria-conflict-
death-toll-at-least-33000-ngo (“Violence in Syria has killed at least 33,082 people, 
most of them civilians . . . .”); Syria Death Toll Nearly 30,000, ALBAWABA (Sept. 20, 
2012, 3:38 PM), http://www.albawaba.com/news/syria-death-toll-nearly-30000-
443029 (citing Syrian Observatory of Human Rights figures); Erika Solomon, 
Syrian Death Toll Now Tops 30,000: Activist Group, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2012, 11:15 
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/26/us-syria-crisis-toll-
idUSBRE88P12Y20120926 (citing a British-based Syrian monitoring group). 
[Editor’s Note: by February, 2013, casualty estimates stood between 70,000 and 
90,000.  Cf. Ashley Fantz, Syria Death Toll Probably at 70,000, U.N. Human Rights 
Official Says, CNN (Feb. 13, 2013, 2:07 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2013/02/12/world/meast/syria-death-toll ; John Kerry: Syria Death Toll Could Be 
90,000, Saudis Say, HUFFPOST WORLD (Feb. 14, 2013, 4:53 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/14/john-kerry-syria-death-toll-
90000_n_2687712.html.] 
32 See Syria Crisis: 28,000 Disappeared, Say Rights Groups, BBC NEWS MIDDLE E. 
(Oct. 18, 2012, 6:29 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
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Nations reported that 10,000 persons were arbitrarily detained 
between mid-March and late June 2011,33 and as many as 40,000 to 
80,000 people are being held in detention today.34   
In fact, a high-level U.N. human rights team reported finding 
systematic human rights violations by the Syrian government, 
including summary executions, prisoner torture, and child 
targeting during the government’s crackdown on opposition 
protestors.35  Based on its findings, the U.N. team recommended 
that Syria be referred to the International Criminal Court for 
prosecution of the alleged atrocities.36  By comparison, the Libyan 
death toll was estimated at more than 1000 on February 23, 2011,37 
only weeks before the U.N. authorized intervention in Libya and 
NATO began flying sorties over the country. 
Precisely because international law does not articulate either 
normative or architectural standards as to when international 
humanitarian intervention is justified, national leaders arguably 
have a responsibility to act.38  For a variety of reasons, the 
                                                                                                                        
19986806 (describing reports by various Syrian human rights groups that say 
disappearances are rampant and part of a deliberate strategy to terrorize people). 
33 See U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Preliminary Report of the High 
Commissioner on the Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 7, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/CRP.1 (Jun. 14, 2011) (reporting that some women and 
children were among the detained, but human rights defenders, political activists, 
and journalists were targeted). 
34 See Syrian Activists Call for Release of Detainees, BBC NEWS MIDDLE E. (Jan. 
20, 2012, 11:22 AM), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16646806 
(reporting on Syrian activists’ protests against the detention of thousands of 
people). 
35 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for 
Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶¶ 
69–91, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/53 (Sept. 15, 2011).  See also Frank Jordans, U.N. 
Syria Mission Finds Systematic Human Rights Violations, HUFFPOST WORLD (Aug. 
18, 2011, 7:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/18/un-syria-
human-rights_n_930577.html (summarizing the findings and recommendations of 
the U.N. mission). 
36 U. N. Human Rights Council, supra note 35, ¶ 94(c). 
37 See Rachel Donadio, Italy Says Death Toll in Libya Is Likely Over 1,000, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/world/ 
europe/24italy.html (noting that although the exact number of deaths in Libya is 
difficult to estimate, reports that over 1000 civilians have been killed appear 
accurate). 
38 See Irwin Cotler & Jared Genser, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/opinion/01iht-
edcotler01.html?_r=2 (“At the U.N. World Summit in 2005, more than 150 heads 
of state and government unanimously adopted a declaration on the responsibility 
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international community has determined—whether actively or 
passively—that the massacre of the Syrian population by the Assad 
government does not justify international humanitarian 
intervention.  While the human rights violations occurring on a 
daily basis do not compare to the horrors of Rwanda,39 Kosovo,40 
or Sierra Leone,41 they are not less compelling than the events 
transpiring in Libya.42 
                                                                                                                        
to protect authorizing international collective action ‘to protect [a state’s] 
population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity’ if that state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, or worse, as in 
the case of Libya, if that state is the author of such criminality.”); Jayshree Bajoria, 
Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 24, 2011), 
http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-responsibility-protect/p24480 (stating that if a 
state fails to protect its citizens from genocide or other war crimes, it becomes the 
international community’s responsibility to do so); Crisis in Syria, INT’L COALITION 
FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ 
index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria (last visited Nov. 17, 2012) (discussing alleged 
human rights violations by the Syrian government and calling for intervention by 
the international community). 
39 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2011: RWANDA 34 (2011), 
available at, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186443.pdf 
(recalling that between 750,000 and 1 million Rwandans were slaughtered during 
the 1994 genocide). 
40 The death toll in Kosovo was estimated between 5,000 and 12,000.  See Q & 
A: Counting Kosovo’s Dead, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 1999, 15:36 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/517168.stm.  For a more recent report, see 
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2009: KOSOVO, available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136039.htm (highlighting the 
lingering human rights impact from the 1999 conflict). 
41 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2009: SIERRA LEONE, available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135975.htm (examining Sierra 
Leone’s failure to respect human rights in areas such as torture and detention 
center conditions). 
42 See, e.g., UN Envoy Warns Over Syria, IAFRICA.COM (Oct. 17, 2012, 5:52 PM), 
http://news.iafrica.com/worldnews/822235.html (describing the global impact 
of the Syrian conflict, negotiations for a truce and ceasefire, and possible 
international intervention); Raghida Dergham, Only Turkey’s Intervention Can 
Cause a Shift in the Syrian Crisis, HUFFPOST WORLD (Oct. 12, 2012, 12:16 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raghida-dergham/only-turkeys-
intervention_b_1961595.html (discussing the various stances of major states 
regarding intervention in Syria); UN Chief Warns of Escalating Syria Conflict 
Dangers, VOICE OF AM. (Oct. 8, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://blogs.voanews.com/ 
breaking-news/2012/10/08/un-chief-warns-of-escalating-syria-conflict-dangers-
3/ (describing Turkey’s retaliatory action against Syria and the latest conflict 
information). 
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5. GEO-POLITICS 
Geopolitics imposes on national leaders the recognition that 
their decisions are not made in a vacuum.  Quite the opposite, for 
the financial and security interdependence between nation-states 
represents the reality of the global community.  To that end, 
viewing the four issues below as the four legs of geo-politics 
significantly facilitates understanding the relationship between the 
nation-state and the global community. 
Effective geo-politics requires a confluence between the 
theoretical and the practical.  The former demands that national 
leaders understand a wide range of issues including international 
law, international relations, finance, geography, and the limits of 
military power.  This requires the implementation of these distinct 
disciplines with sensitivity both to domestic politics and the global 
community while recognizing the importance of tactical and 
strategic issues alike.  Though, prima facie, tactical and strategic 
considerations suggest a dissonance, effective national leaders are 
able to incorporate both in the decision-making process. 
Tactical thinking reflects national security decision-making 
focused solely on the immediate security impact, whereas strategic 
thinking reflects keen understanding of and appreciation for the 
long term, devoid of immediate results and impact.  Perhaps 
circumstances justify, or dictate, a narrow national security 
perspective; while that may be the case, effective leadership 
demands the ability to weigh and broadly consider the 
ramifications of particular decision points.  A leader who cannot 
consider issues beyond the immediate is incapable of engaging in 
effective geo-politics.  A leader whose focus is exclusively tactical 
is incapable of identifying future national security threats and 
risks. 
A global community implies enhanced cooperation across a 
wide range of issues including finance, security, border control, 
environment, health care, and natural resources.  National leaders, 
understandably, primarily emphasize domestic considerations.  
Nevertheless, effective geo-politics suggest national interests are 
significantly enhanced when international affairs are factored into 
domestic decision-making.  That is, rather than focusing primarily 
on its own particular and specific needs, geo-politics implies 
recognition that global markets and global security enhance 
domestic economy and domestic security alike. 
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While international law places great emphasis on sovereignty, 
geo-politics and recognition of world order implies limits on 
actions individual nation-states may take.  This limit, whether self-
imposed or externally imposed, seeks to avert conflict with 
unpredictable ramifications.  In addition, respect for the principle 
of sovereignty is minimized in the context of humanitarian 
intervention.  After all, the very act of intervention, regardless of its 
basis, implies violating the sovereignty of a nation-state. 
Decisions to intervene in the domestic affairs of a nation-state 
imply violation of national sovereignty.  Conversely, not 
intervening in the face of human rights violations reflects 
unwillingness to interfere in domestic matters of a sovereign 
nation though consequences of the decision are clear.  The 
dilemma whether, when, and how to engage in humanitarian 
intervention is directly related to geo-politics: in many ways it 
highlights the tension in balancing sovereignty with humanitarian-
predicated intervention.  This tension, much like determining how 
to most effectively respond to the Iranian threat, is at the heart of 
contemporary geo-politics. 
The decision whether to intervene requires discerning the 
proper role of the international community regarding domestic 
issues of a sovereign state.  With the exception of refugees seeking 
safe haven in a bordering country, domestic human rights 
violations do not have impact beyond the borders of the state 
engaged in rights violations.  That is in direct contrast to the threat 
potentially posed to the international community by a nuclear Iran.  
Nevertheless, both paradigms reflect cutting edge issues relevant 
to contemporary geo-politics. 
6. LOOKING FORWARD 
The question, then, is: What is the responsibility of the 
international community to civilians massacred by their own 
government?  It goes without saying that some killed by the Assad 
regime are engaged in armed conflict with Syrian forces.  Of that, 
there is no doubt.  However, the massacre of women and children, 
many of whom were tortured, must be distinguished from the 
killing of those firing on Syrian soldiers.43  The consistent refusal, 
                                                     
43 See Frida Ghitis, Why the Syrian Regime is Killing Babies, CNNOPINION 
(August 16, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/31/opinion/ghitis-
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best described as brazen, unrelenting, and deliberate, to 
distinguish between innocent civilians and legitimate targets is a 
clear violation of international law.  Nevertheless, the international 
community has chosen to ignore the months-long campaign 
conducted by the Assad regime. This is not the first time the world 
has turned its back on innocent civilians killed by their own 
regime; nor, tragically, will it be the last.44  It is equally predictable 
that the international community’s hackneyed clichés regarding 
the Syrian civil war will be re-articulated in the next humanitarian 
crisis.  In both cases, the present Syrian conflict and in future 
conflicts, the international community will fail in its responsibility 
to protect innocent people.  Re-articulated, the international 
community will limit itself to phrases devoid of substance and 
significance; at best, the oft-repeated clichés resemble a bad rerun 
providing neither relief nor hope for an all-too vulnerable civilian 
population. 
In many ways, it is a pattern that repeats itself time after time, 
just as the cliché responses sound like a bad rerun.  While 
discussions are held and platitudes uttered (if not muttered), the 
killing continues unabated.  The important key, from our 
perspective, is why.  “It is not our fight as we don’t have a dog in 
the fight” or “we can’t be everywhere” or “why doesn’t someone 
else step in” are understandable responses as they resonate with a 
public focused on the current economic crisis.45  It is not by chance 
that Syria has barely registered on the radar screen in the recent 
U.S. Presidential election; after all, the two candidates largely 
ignored Afghanistan, where American military personnel are 
directly in harm’s way.  In addition, Syria is a resource-poor 
                                                                                                                        
syria-killing-children/index.html (reporting that forces loyal to President Bashar 
al-Assad killed at least 108 people, including women and children).  
44 See Jeb Sharp, Intervention in Libya, Why Not Darfur?, PUB. RADIO INT’L 
(April 6, 2011, 2:25 AM), http://www.pri.org/stories/world/africa/intervention-
in-libya-why-not-darfur.html (noting that the United Nations deployed 
peacekeeping forces in Darfur, but perhaps only when it was too late).  
45 See Doug Bandow, No to Intervention in Syria, AM. SPECTATOR (June 8, 2012, 
6:09 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/2012/06/08/no-to-intervention-in-syria 
(arguing that “the U.S. needs peace, not more wars”); Gary C. Gambill, 
Intervention Won’t Save Syria, NAT’L INTEREST (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/humanitarian-intervention-wont-save-
syria-7501 (“Absent a workable plan for saving lives or a compelling strategic 
rationale for intervention, the United States should stay out of the conflict” and 
use other measures to limit the potential for atrocity). 
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country (meaning, no oil) with no clearly articulated or understood 
importance from the perspective of U.S. interests.46  In other words, 
why should we give a damn? 
Those who dismiss the national interest argument are not at 
fault; in large part, the Obama Administration has failed to make a 
compelling case either for or against intervention, and the media 
have, largely, failed to force the Administration to articulate its 
rationale for non-intervention.47  While the massacre of more than 
21,00048 Syrian civilians raises legitimate questions regarding 
humanitarian intervention and the limits of sovereignty, there are, 
naturally, additional considerations essential to this conversation.  
Those additional considerations, in conjunction with humanitarian 
intervention principles, provide much food for thought with 
respect to future dilemmas and paradigms. 
Re-articulated: regimes that massacre their civilians will 
continue to haunt mankind; history very clearly shows this.49  The 
question is whether humanitarian obligations, however defined 
and implemented, dictate government policy or whether geo-
political considerations and calculations rule the day.  In many 
ways, the answer is in the question.  Were nation-states guided 
                                                     
46 See Chris Mansur, Why NATO Cannot Deal with Syria, in the Same Way as 
Libya, OILPRICE (July 2, 2012, 8:44 PM), http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-
East/Why-NATO-Cannot-Deal-with-Syria-in-the-Same-Way-as-Libya.html 
(explaining that because Syria does not have a large oil industry, foreign countries 
do not have any long-term oil interests in that country). 
47 For an important insight into the larger nature of the conflict in Syria, see 
David E. Sanger, Rebel Arms Flow Is Said to Benefit Jihadists in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-
receiving-most-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc= 
edit_th_20121015 (describing international involvement in the Syrian conflict, 
such as arms shipments, access to intelligence, and U.S. concerns should the 
conflict lead to a regime change); Sebnem Arsu & Michael Schwirtz, As Tension 
Escalates, Turkey Issues a Ban on All Syrian Aircraft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/turkey-bans-all-
syrian-aircraft-as-tension-over-war-escalates.html?nl=todaysheadlines& 
emc=edit_th (describing Turkey’s response to Syrian aircraft and other military 
incursions onto Turkish soil and the latest incidents in the Syrian conflict). 
48 See Syrian Death Toll Now Tops 30,000, supra note 31. 
49 See generally, ROBERT PASTOR, EXISTING THE WHIRLPOOL: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARD LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (2ND .ED, 2001); Peter S. Michaels, 
Lawless Intervention: United States Foreign Policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 7 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 223 (1987) (describing a history of government massacres of 
civilians in Latin America). 
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solely by humanitarian principles, then massacres committed by 
nation-states against their own civilian populations would have 
been mitigated, even at the risk of violating sovereignty.  However, 
nation-states are—as history repeatedly teaches us—guided by an 
additional set of principles best described as self-interest and geo-
politics. 
To the point: a powerful combination of factors—the 
extraordinary volatility of the Middle East, the uncertainty with 
respect to Iran’s nuclear development, the heightened tensions 
between Syria and Turkey, and the ‘Egypt to where’ uncertainty—
suggest that the massacre in Syria takes a backseat to larger, more 
combustible considerations.  While those four uncertainties rightly 
weigh on the minds of decision-makers, the practical result of 
disregarding the massacre in Syria—meaningless platitudes 
notwithstanding—is that thousands of people will be killed in the 
days and months ahead.  While not, evidently, of geo-political 
significance, it raises profoundly important questions regarding 
the practical essence of humanitarian intervention and whether 
age-old historical patterns will inevitably repeat themselves. 
It has been suggested to me that intervention in Syria is a 
logistical and operational nightmare because of uncertainty 
regarding the nature of the forces in conflict with the Assad 
regime.  Perhaps.  But, perhaps not.  The sense is that operational 
difficulty is an all-too-comfortable rationalization for an 
uncomfortable reality: cold geo-political realities trump 
humanitarian considerations.  Articulation of this standard would 
reflect maturity on the part of national leaders who are clearly not 
guided either by the spirit or letter of humanitarian intervention.  
The decision not to intervene is not predicated by concerns 
regarding sovereignty; rather, as the title to this Essay suggests, 
humanitarian intervention and sovereignty are under the umbrella 
of geo-politics.  That is the essence of contemporary diplomacy and 
international relations.  While not distinct from innumerable 
historical examples, perhaps the time has come for national leaders 
to stand up and proclaim that geo-politics trumps the principles of 
intervention in international law. 
A final thought: the tipping point towards intervention and 
military action may come, rather ironically, as a result of increased 
tension, activity, and violence along the border between Syria and 
Turkey.  The U.N. and Arab League have warned that this isolated 
violence can easily turn into a larger regional conflagration.  If 
Turkey is attacked outright, or otherwise under assault, the U.N. 
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would arguably be forced to defend a member nation; this action 
would be defined as defense of a fellow member nation rather than 
an act of humanitarian intervention.50 
                                                     
50 See supra note 42. 
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